Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 34
Issue 3
SYMPOSIUM:
Ruling the World: Generating International Legal
Norms

Article 14

2009

Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Problem of
Asymmetric Information: The Santiago Principles
and International Regulations
Anthony Wong

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
Recommended Citation
Anthony Wong, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Problem of Asymmetric Information: The Santiago Principles and International
Regulations, 34 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2009).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol34/iss3/14

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND THE
PROBLEM OF ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION: THE SANTIAGO
PRINCIPLES AND INTERNATIONAL
REGULATIONS
INTRODUCTION

I

n 2008 and 2009, Sovereign Wealth Funds (“SWF”) appeared almost daily in financial news and had risen in significance in international capital markets and policy circles. Having grown in number and
size, SWFs are now the second largest class of investors in the international capital market.1 In general terms, SWFs are private equity funds
run by governments to manage their excess foreign reserves. They are
among a range of investment vehicles that governments can employ to
manage excess revenues or foreign reserves.2 One of the key differences
between SWFs and other investment vehicles is that SWFs typically have
higher risk preferences and return expectations.3
SWFs, however, are not a new phenomenon in the international capital
market. One of the oldest SWFs dates back to 1953, when Kuwait established the Kuwait Investment Authority (“KIA”),4 and, as Dr. Lyons5
1. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345,
1356 (2008). SWFs lag only behind large institutional asset managers such as Fidelity
and Barclays. François Bujon de l’Estang, Chairman, Citi France, presentation at Tables
rondes finance islamique et fonds souverains des 14 et 15 mai 2008: Sovereign Wealth
Funds: Growing Global Force 3 (May 15, 2008), available at http://www.senat.fr/commission/
fin/actualites/fs_bujon.ppt.
2. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1354 (“Sovereign wealth funds belong to a
continuum of sovereign investment vehicles. At one end of the spectrum are central
banks. At the other end are state-owned enterprises such as Russia’s Gazprom or China’s
National Offshore Oil Corp. In between are sovereign stabilization funds, sovereign saving funds, and government investment corporations. Thus one way to define sovereign
wealth funds is by exclusion: SWFs are sovereign investment vehicles that are not central
banks, monetary authorities in charge of foreign reserves, or national pension funds, unless they are financed by commodities exports.”); Edward F. Greene & Brian A. Yeager,
Sovereign Wealth Funds—A Measured Assessment, 3 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 247, 249
(2008). See also Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Growing
Global Force 11 (2008).
3. Robert M. Kimmitt, Public Footprints in Private Markets: Sovereign Wealth
Funds and the World Economy, FOREIGN AFF., Jan/Feb 2008, at 119
4. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 120. See also GERARD LYONS, STANDARD CHARTERED
BANK, STATE CAPITALISM: THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 5, 22 (2007); Testimony Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, U.S. H.R.: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth
Funds: Impacts on US Foreign Policy and Economic Interests, at 8 (May 21, 2008) (tes-
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noted, “Of the twenty two largest SWFs . . . seven were in existence before 1990, six started in the 90s and nine since the millennium.”6
Despite the number of years SWFs have existed, their sheer number
and size have recently raised a number of concerns.7 Among these are
that “SWFs are a threat to the sovereignty of the nations in whose corporation they invest” and that “the nations whose corporations are targets of
investments are said to be threatened with becoming ‘sharecropper’
states if ownership of industry moves to foreign-government absentee
holders.”8 The biggest concern, however, is that SWFs will make decisions for political or strategic reasons rather than economic and commercial ones.9 In fact, the increasing number of SWFs and the ownership
stakes they are taking have led to an outcry for regulatory control and for
opposition to SWF investment in recipient countries.10
In this Note, I will discuss the various concerns surrounding SWFs, the
need for international regulation, and possible solutions to some of the
problems SWFs raise. The focus of this discussion is on the problem of
asymmetric information. Asymmetric information occurs when one party
has better information than the counterparty.11 SWFs are not in the same
position as typical private parties in business relationships, which might
have superior information. First, unlike private parties, SWFs might have
interests that are not economic or commercial in nature.12 Second, SWFs

timony of Edwin M. Truman, Senior Fellow, Peterson Inst.), available at http://www.
petersoninstitute.org/publications/papers/truman0508.pdf [hereinafter Truman Testimony].
5. Dr. Gerard Lyons is Chief Economist and Group Head of Global Research at
Standard Chartered. Lyons, Chief Economist and Group Head of Global Research, Standard Chartered, Speech at the Institute for International Bankers Annual Washington
Conference: Two Hot Topics: Sovereign Wealth Funds and China 3 (Mar. 3, 2008),
available at http://wholesalebanking.standardchartered.com/en/capabilities/financialmarkets/
research/Documents/thoughtleadershpspeeches.pdf.
6. Id. at 5.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1345–46.
9. Id. at 1346.
10. See Katrin Bennhold, Sovereign Wealth Funds Seek Balance Against Western
Regulation, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/23/
business/fund.php; US Treasury Cautions China over Sovereign Wealth Fund, CHANNEL
NEWSASIA, Feb. 8, 2008, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific_business/
view/327561/1/.html; Cathy Mputhia, Sovereign Funds Rub Governments the Wrong
Way, BUS. DAILY (Africa), Sept. 10, 2008, http://www.bdafrica.com/index.php?option=
com_content&task=view&id=9923&Itemid=5848.
11. Press Release, The Royal Swedish Acad. of Sci., Advance Information for Award
of the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1–2 (Oct.
10, 2001), http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2001/ecoadv.pdf.
12. Lyons, supra note 5, at 5.
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introduce state capitalism to the market.13 The problem of asymmetric
information is the source of the problems surrounding SWFs and that any
regulation of SWFs must address this issue.
Part I will provide a background discussion on SWFs. Particularly, I
will focus on their significance to the global capital market, the current
global market’s effect on SWFs, and how the United States currently
regulates SWF investments. Part II discusses the need for regulations,
while Part III addresses why SWFs must be regulated internationally.
Part IV discusses the newly adopted Santiago Principles created by the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) to govern SWF conducts.
I. BACKGROUND ON SWFS
A. What Are SWFs?
As the Acting Under Secretary for International Affairs in the U.S.
Treasury Department, Clay Lowery, noted in his remarks concerning
SWFs, “There is no universal, agreed definition [of SWFs].”14 However,
because SWFs are only one of several ways a government can manage
and invest in the global capital market,15 “[d]ifferentiation between different types of sovereign-controlled entities is integral to identifying policy issues raised by their activities, and in crafting appropriate policies to
address such issues.”16
The definitions offered by the U.S. Treasury Department (“Treasury
Department”) and the IMF are helpful for discussion purposes. The Treasury Department defines an SWF as “a government investment vehicle
which is funded by foreign exchange assets, and which manages those
assets separately from official reserves.”17 The IMF adopted a similar
definition: a “government-owned investment [fund], set up for a variety
of macroeconomic purposes. They are commonly funded by the transfer
of foreign exchange assets that are invested long term, overseas.”18
13. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1346.
14. Clay Lowery, Acting Under Sec’y for Int’l Affairs, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Remarks
on Sovereign Wealth Funds and the International Financial System (June 21, 2007),
http://www.treas.gov/press/release/hp471.htm.
15. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 120. See also Lyons, supra note 5, at 5.
16. Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 249. Even within the realm of SWFs, there are
different ways to organize and structure an SWF. See INT’L WORKING GROUP OF
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, INT’L MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS:
GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES “SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” 11 (2008).
17. Lowery, supra note 14.
18. INT’L MONETARY FUND, MONETARY AND CAPITAL MARKETS AND POLICY
DEVELOPMENT AND REVIEW DEPARTMENTS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS—A WORK
AGENDA 4 (Mark Allen & Jaime Caruana eds., 2008).
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Dr. Lyons offers a slightly more specific and detailed definition. He
limits it to four features: (i) the organization is owned by a sovereign nation state, but, as an exception, includes five subnational-level funds
“that are financed by foreign exchange assets resulting from commodities exports, and that are large enough to rank within [the] top [twentytwo SWFs]”;19 (ii) the organization is “[n]ot a national pension fund, unless [it is] financed directly by foreign exchange assets generated by
commodity exports”; (iii) the organization is “not [a] central bank[] or
[authority] that perform[s] roles typical of a central bank”; and (iv) the
organization is a “investment fund[] rather than producer[] of goods or
services.”20
Finally, in the recently published Santiago Principles, the IMF’s International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds defined SWFs as
“special-purpose investment funds or arrangements that are owned by the
general government.”21 The term “general government” includes “both
central government and subnational government.”22 The definition excludes, “inter alia, foreign currency reserve assets held by monetary authorities for the traditional balance of payments or monetary policy
purposes, state-owned enterprises . . . in the traditional sense, government-employee pension funds, or assets managed for the benefit of individuals.”23
While these definitions are useful in defining the limits of SWF, it is
important to recognize that they are both over-inclusive and underinclusive.24 However, this Note will be using the International Working
Group’s definition for SWFs because it is sufficiently broad to include
most of the entities affected by the Santiago Principles.
B. Who Has SWFs?
As of 2009, there are over twenty-two entities widely accepted as
SWFs.25 The seven largest are known as the “Super Seven,” and each has
19. The five subnational-level funds large enough to be ranked with the top twentytwo SWFs are ADIA (Abu Dhabi), Istihmar (Dubai), Dubai International Capital, Alberta
Heritage Savings Trust Fund (Canada), and Alaska’s Permanent Reserve Fund. Lyons,
supra note 5, at 23–24.
20. Id.
21. See INT’L WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, supra note 16, at 3.
22. See id. at 3 n.5.
23. See id. at 3 n.6.
24. See Lyons, supra note 5, at 23. For example, the IMF definition does not explicitly exclude noncommodity-based national pension funds. The Treasury definition does not
include central banks that perform management functions for foreign investments such as
the Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority.
25. Id. at 23.
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over $100 billion in assets.26 The Super Seven includes Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, the Government Pension Fund of Norway, KIA, China Investment
Corporation, Russia National Wealth Fund, and Temasek Holdings.27 Of
the listed owners, United Arab Emirates’ Abu Dhabi Investment Authority possesses the largest SWF, with assets estimated to be somewhere between $250 billion and $1 trillion.28 Another player of note in this league
of large SWFs is the China Investment Corporation (“CIC”), which has
an initial endowment of $200 billion.29 While not as large as the Super
Seven, the holdings of other SWFs are still quite substantial.30
C. Why Create SWFs?
The goals of SWFs, unsurprisingly, depend on to whom they belong
and the source of their endowments.31 Apart from potential political and
strategic motivations, SWFs are typically created in order to achieve any
combination of the following goals: macroeconomic stabilization, intergeneration transfers, higher returns, and domestic industrial developments.32
Countries that establish SWFs for macroeconomic stabilization purposes are usually “highly dependent on commodity exports” because
they are “exposed to swings in global prices.”33 For countries like Russia,34 the macroeconomic stabilization component functions (i) by supplementing government revenues when there is a decrease in global pric26. Id. at 7.
27. Id. See generally Truman Testimony, supra note 4, at 8 (providing a more complete list of SWFs).
28. Bujon de l’Estang, supra note 1, at 4; Lyons, supra note 5, at 32. Standard Charter estimates Abu Dhabi’s assets to be approximately $600 billion, but Citigroup estimates the assets to be closer to $875 billion. Bujon de l’Estang, supra note 1, at 4; Lyons,
supra note 5, at 32. The results of the estimates vary significantly due to the lack of
transparency of Abu Dhabi’s fund.
29. Bujon de l’Estang, supra note 1, at 9; Lyons, supra note 5, at 36.
30. See generally Lyons, supra note 5, at 32–62 (providing a list and features of the
twenty-two largest SWFs).
31. See id. at 29.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Russia is exposed to global swings in commodity prices because its exports are
concentrated in a few commodities (i.e., oil, natural gas, metals, and timber). These exports account for over eighty percent of Russia’s exports and thirty percent of government revenues. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACT BOOK (2008). See also
Lyons, supra note 5, at 37. Countries that also depend on a few commodities good for
their economies are similarly situated, since their economies are not sufficiently diversified.
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es, and (ii) by absorbing excess revenues when there is an increase in
global prices, thereby preventing inflation.35 An SWF with macroeconomic stabilizing goals can helps minimize “short- and medium-term
fluctuations.”36 Similarly, countries dependent on finite commodity resources (e.g., oil and coal) may create SWFs to preserve the wealth of
these national resources for future generations by converting them into
financial resources.37 This wealth could be used to finance pension funds,
such as Norway’s Government Pension Fund,38 or be used as an “alternative to oil reserves for . . . future generations,” such as Kuwait’s KIA.39
Higher returns are also a common objective of SWFs.40 Traditionally,
foreign reserves are kept and maintained by the country’s central bank.41
Due to the goals42 and roles that central banks serve, their assets tend to
be held in lower risk and lower-yielding financial vehicles.43 With the
build up of reserves,44 these countries are motivated by the “opportunity
cost associated with funds being invested in risk free assets” to seek

35. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 120; Y.V. Reddy, Governor, Reserve Bank of India,
Address at the Golden Jubilee Celebrations of the Foreign Exchange Dealers’ Association of India, Mumbai: Forex Reserves, Stabilization Funds, and Sovereign Wealth
Funds: Indian Perspective 3 (Oct. 8, 2007).
36. Lyons, supra note 5, at 29.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 33.
39. Id. at 35.
40. Id. at 29.
41. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 120.
42. The IMF lists six major objectives for central banks:
support and maintain confidence in the policies for monetary and exchange rate
management . . . ; limit external vulnerability by maintaining foreign currency
liquidity to absorb shocks during times of crisis or when access to borrowing is
curtailed . . . ; provide a level of confidence to markets that a country can meet
its external obligations; demonstrate the backing of domestic currency by external assets; assist the government in meeting its foreign exchange needs and
external debt obligations; and maintain a reserve for national disasters or emergencies.
INT’L MONETARY FUND, GUIDELINES FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE MANAGEMENT
(2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/ferm/eng/index.htm#I.
43. See John Nugée, Foreign Exchange Reserves Management, in CTR. FOR CENT.
BANKING STUDIES BANK OF ENG. 26–29 (Handbooks in Central Banking No. 19, 2000).
44. By 2006, Asian central banks, at $3.1 trillion, held over sixty percent of the global
foreign reserves. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., THE NEW POWER BROKERS: HOW OIL,
ASIA, HEDGE FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY ARE SHAPING GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 73
(2007), http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/The_New_Power_Brokers/.
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higher returns for their money.45 Finally, some countries utilize SWFs to
“restructure and encourage domestic industries.”46
D. Why Are SWFs Significant?
SWFs are significant for a variety of reasons. Primary among these are
the size of their asset holdings and their investment strategies. Already
holding an estimated $2–3 trillion in assets,47 SWFs are projected by various commentators to grow rapidly during the next decade and reach an
estimated value of somewhere between $7 trillion and $13.4 trillion in
assets.48 However, even when we use the upper estimated aggregate size
of SWFs, $3 trillion, the amount of assets held by SWFs is small when
compared to the amount of global financial assets or U.S. denominated
assets in existence. As a point of reference, in 2006, global financial assets were estimated to be about $164 trillion, and U.S. denominated assets about $56.1 trillion. 49 This means that SWFs are only 1.8% and 6%,
respectively, of these markets. Nonetheless, even though SWFs hold a
small share of the global capital markets, they should not be ignored. At
$3 trillion, they have more assets than both hedge funds50 and private
equities51 combined.52 Even individually, the six largest SWFs are comparable to the largest institutional investors in the world.53 Regardless of
what metric of reference we use to assess the size of their holdings,
SWFs are large enough to affect market prices.54
Besides their size, another important concern is their investment strategy. As noted above, traditionally, countries manage their foreign reserves
45. Lyons, supra note 5, at 29.
46. Id.
47. Simon Johnson, The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 44 FIN. & DEV. (Sept.
2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/straight.htm.
48. See STEPHEN JEN, MORGAN STANLEY, HOW BIG COULD SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS BE BY 2015? at 2 (2007) (projecting SWF assets to reach $12 tirllion by 2015);
John Lipsky, First Deputy Managing Dir. of the Int’l Monetary Fund, Speech at the Seminar:
Sovereign Funds: Responsibility with Our Future 2 (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www.
imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/090308.htm (projecting SWF assets to reach $7-13
trillion by 2013); Lyons, supra note 5, at 9 (projecting SWF assets to reach $13.4 trillion
over the next decade).
49. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., MAPPING GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS FOURTH ANNUAL
REPORT 10–11 (2008), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/mapping_
global/.
50. Hedge funds are estimated to have approximately $1–1.5 trillion in assets. Lyons,
supra note 5, at 11.
51. Private equities are estimated to have $0.7–1.1 trillion in assets. Id.
52. Id.
53. Bujon de l’Estang, supra note 1, at 3.
54. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 122.
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with their central banks or financial ministries that perform central bank
functions.55 Central banks and their equivalents have typically focused
their investment in low-risk and low-yield assets (e.g., U.S. treasury
bonds) to preserve liquidity.56 With the significant accumulation of foreign reserves, preservation of liquidity becomes less important and countries shift their asset allocation to include more higher-risk and higheryield assets (e.g., equity, real estates, and hedge funds).57
While SWFs do raise policy concerns, they can also be very beneficial
to the global capital market if managed properly. SWFs are “in principle
long-term investors, which typically do not deviate from their strategic
asset allocations in the face of short-term volatility.”58 By shifting away
from debt assets, SWFs are actually promoting a more stable financial
market by reducing the effects of entry and withdrawal that would otherwise occur in the debt market.59 They also allow the reserve-rich countries to “recycle trade surpluses and to increase the supply of funds to the
equity market,” thereby “reducing the cost of capital.”60 SWFs are particularly attractive for this function because they are not highly leveraged
and can provide liquidity to the capital market.61
E. How Does the United States Regulate SWF Investments?
In the United States, since 1988, foreign directed investments (“FDIs”)
were subject to the Exon-Florio Amendment. 62 After the controversial
attempt by China National Offshore Oil Company and Dubai Ports
World to acquire Unocal, and Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation
Company, respectively, Congress passed the Foreign Investment and
National Security Act of 2007 (“FINSA”) to amend the Exon-Florio
Amendment.63 FINSA confers on the president the power to “suspend or
prohibit any covered transaction that threatens to impair the national se55. Id. at 120.
56. See Nugée, supra note 43, at 26–29.
57. See id. Acting Under Secretary for International Affairs Clay Lowery explains
that “force diversification” is occurring because the amount of assets held by SWFs have
outgrown the amount of debt assets in the world. Lowery, supra note 14.
58. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 122.
59. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1360.
60. Id. at 1360.
61. Id. at 1360; Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 122.
62. “Exon-Florio amend[ed] Title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950.” W.
Robert Shearer, The Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist Legislation Susceptible to
Abuse, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1729, 1731 n.12 (1993). See also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1988)
(amended 2007); Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1349; Greene & Yeager, supra note
2, at 261.
63. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1349; Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 261.
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curity of the United States.”64 Further, the statute makes the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) responsible for
(i) review[ing] acquisitions by foreign persons of control of US businesses in the interest of US national security during a [thirty] day period after notice or its own initiation of the review, (ii) [investigating]
such acquisitions during an additional [forty-five] day period if the
transaction threatens the national security of the US, is by a foreign
government controlled entity, would result in critical infrastructure
coming under control of a foreign person or the government agency
leading the review so recommends and (iii) report[ing] its findings to
Congress.65

Since its inception in 1975, by March 2006, CFIUS had reviewed over
1600 cases of foreign acquisitions.66 In 2006, “of approximately 10,000
[mergers and acquisitions] transactions [in the United States], 1,730 were
cross-border.”67 During that year, 113 of the cross-border transactions
were subject to CFIUS review but none were blocked.68 Despite the
number of cases it reviewed, however, the Committee has investigated
only twenty-five and submitted twelve of them to the president for decision.69 Of the twelve cases, the president elected to allow eleven of the
transactions to proceed.70 The only occurrence of a presidential divestment of FDI occurred in 1990 when President George H.W. Bush ordered China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation
to divest its interest in MAMCO, an aircraft parts company.71

64. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d) (2007).
65. Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 261 (citation omitted). See also 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2170 (2007).
66. Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Mar. 2,
2006) (testimony by Robert Kimmitt, Deputy Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js4086.htm [hereinafter Kimmitt Testimony].
67. Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 262; Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 123.
68. Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 262; Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 123.
69. Kimmitt Testimony, supra note 66.
70. Id.
71. See id. (indicating that since 1988, the president only ordered one forced
divestiture out of the twelve cases submitted for decision after investigation);
Message from George H.W. Bush, President of the U.S., to U.S. Congress on the China
National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation Divestiture of MAMCO Manufacturing, Incorporated (Feb. 1, 1990), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=18109); ANN M. CALVARESI-BARR, DIR., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, DEFENSE TRADE: ENHANCEMENTS TO
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXON-FLORIO COULD STRENGTHEN THE LAW’S EFFECTIVENESS,
GAO Doc. No. 05-686, at 10 (2005); KATHERINE V. SCHINASI, ASSOC. DIR., U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATE, DEFENSE TRADE:
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As Edward Greene and Brian Yeager72 noted, “despite the small number of final negative determinations by CFIUS, CFIUS review can have
an in terrorem effect that discourages transactions.”73 In addition to
FINSA, SWFs are also subject to various traditional regulations such as
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, and the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.74
II. CONCERNS INVOLVING SWFS
The growing importance of SWFs raises various policy issues and
concerns for host countries, recipient countries, and the international capital market in general. Of these concerns, lack of transparency, economic
protectionism, market distortions, conflicts of interest, strategic positioning, and national security are at the forefront of the debate. Each of these
issues must be addressed carefully in order to ensure that SWFs are not
unduly restricted when providing necessary protection to all parties.
A. Lack of Transparency
One of recipient countries’ largest complaints is the lack of transparency of some SWFs.75 While some hedge funds and private equity funds
are equally, if not more, secretive about their investments, recipient
countries have found the opaqueness of SWFs much more alarming.76 As
one commentator suggests, this is not because SWFs are nontransparent
about their investments, but because they are government owned.77 Also,

IDENTIFYING FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY CAN BE IMPROVED,
GAO/NSIAD Doc. No. 00-144, at 9 (2000).
72. Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 247 n*.
73. Id. at 262; Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 123. The authors give the example of a CIC
official’s statement that “[CIC] will not consider investments in the USA that may be
subject to CFIUS review,” after the failure of Bain Capital and Huawei Technologies’s
bid to acquire 3Com. Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 262.
74. Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 264–66. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–50;
15 U.S.C. § 18a; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll.
75. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1360; Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 268;
Lowery, supra note 14; Lyons, supra note 5, at 12–14.
76. See Lyons, supra note 5, at 6. As Deputy Secretary Kimmitt stated, the framework for market discipline applicable to hedge funds to mitigate systematic risk is not
applicable to SWFs. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 128. This is because “SWFs are publicsector entities managing public funds, and profit maximization may not be considered the
primary objective.” Id. Unlike hedge funds, the key avenues for transparency between the
fund and counterparties, and among counterparties, creditors, and regulators are not applicable, and counterparties may rely on sovereign guarantees to ensure payment rather
than practice market discipline. Id.
77. Lyons, supra note 7.
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the opaqueness of SWFs has the potential of affecting private investors
due to uncertainties involving the funds’ behavior.78
In regards to transparency concerns, one commentator has noted that
SWFs have never conducted themselves in any way to warrant the suspicion placed on them.79 The lack of evidence of wrongful conduct, however, is largely irrelevant. This commentator failed to recognize that what
is perceived to be true can be far more important than what is actually
true. If an SWF is perceived to be acting with ulterior motives, a country
will most likely take action against the perceived threat. The mere fact
that the perception is wrong or that there is no evidence to support that
perception will therefore not make much of a difference. While some
might argue that States should not act in such a manner, this is the only
rational decision. In terms of game theory, countries are in a noncooperative game environment and have an asymmetry of information
problem.80 While countries often do cooperate with each other, they are
still in such an environment because there is no way to form binding and
enforceable agreements.81 It is important to remember that countries
cooperate with each other voluntarily and there is no meaningful way to
force compliance short of going to war.82
78. Lowery, supra note 14. See also Truman, supra note 4, at 3.
79. Bader M. Al Sa’ad, Kuwait Inv. Auth., Key Note Speech at the First Luxembourg
Foreign Trade Conference: Overview on the Kuwait Investment Authority and Issues
Related to Sovereign Wealth Funds 6 (Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://www.kia.gov.kw/
NR/rdonlyres/67D2B0DD-450D-4B51-B522-C2BE1C00F12D/916/FINA_SPCH_LUXE
MBORG_APR_9_092.pdf.
80. See generally 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 133–35 (John
Eatwell et al. eds., 1987); 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 661–63
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). In a non-cooperative game setting, there exists no institution that can make binding any agreement among players. 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE A
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra, at 661. Asymmetric information occurs when players
of a particular game are not privy to the same information. 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE A
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra, at 133.
81. It could be argued that countries will comply with international agreements and
treaties because noncompliance would be too costly and even as “soft law,” these rules
can still have practical effects. Francis Snyder, The Effectiveness of European Community
Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques, in IMPLEMENTING EC LAW IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM: STRUCTURES FOR INDIRECT RULE 64 (Terence Daintith ed., 1995).
However, because compliance of international law in general is voluntary, there is always
a risk that a country will decide that the benefit of noncompliance outweighs the cost of
compliance. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L
L. 705, 705 (1988). In such a non-cooperative environment, one cannot assume that the
mere fact that a party is complying with international agreements or treaties now means
there will be compliance in the future.
82. See Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When It Is a Treaty We Are
Expounding, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1285 n.264 (2005) (citing Patricia McGowan
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Countries are also plagued with the problem of asymmetry of information. There is simply no way for a country to predict how counterparties
will behave, and there is always a risk that they will guess wrong. Therefore, countries can only act on the information that they perceive to be
true, and depending on the urgency of the situation, there may not be an
opportunity to ascertain the accuracy of the information before taking
adverse action.
Furthermore, even though some SWFs have existed for a long time,
their opaqueness also creates concerns about their potential impact on
market stability.83 Markets and investors do not have extensive experience dealing with SWFs or similar entities because countries tended to
prefer debt assets in the past and held little, if any, equity assets.84 Therefore, because SWF investment policies are poorly understood, markets
will experience greater volatility when they have, or are suspected to
have, SWF participation.85 With no information or experience to guide
them, market participants have no way to distinguish mere rumors from
actual facts, or minor comments from significant ones.86 This increases
the level of uncertainty and risk associated with participating in the market. Elevated risk levels will increase the cost of capital because a higher
risk premium will be needed to compensate parties for the amplified risk.
With that said, however, it is important to bear in mind that mere formal disclosure would not resolve any of the transparency concerns.87
Disclosures are only as meaningful as the creditability of the disclosing
party. A party’s denials and disclosures have little creditability when the
party is already suspected or accused of misconduct. Similarly, if a host
government lacks creditability, any statements made or disclosures published are unlikely to be taken at face value. This illustrates that the real
concern regarding transparency is the problem of asymmetric information and underscores the need for a credible method to ascertain the truth.
This problem places SWFs that lack creditability but are innocent of any
misconduct at risk of unwarranted adverse actions. Any regulation of
SWFs must address these transparency and creditability concerns.

Wald, Judging at the Hague, JUD. DIVISION REC., Summer 2002, at 19–20) (noting that
international law has been enforced “only by voluntary compliance, diplomacy, threats of
war or war itself”).
83. Lowery, supra note 14.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1362 (discussing the problem of voluntary
disclosures).
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B. Economic Nationalism and Protectionism
Another concern raised by the increased globalization of the financial
market is the growing sentiments of economic nationalism and protectionism that FDIs have sparked. Despite the benefits that globalization
can bring, this is a sensitive issue that is not just limited to industrialized
countries, but is also prevalent in emerging market economies.88 China’s
and Dubai’s attempted acquisition of major U.S. assets caused such a
political outcry in the United States that the parties withdrew their bid for
acquisition.89 Similarly, Germany recently proposed new legislation to
allow the Economy Minister to scrutinize purchases of stakes of twentyfive percent or more in German firms by buyers from outside the European Union and its four partners in the European Free Trade Association
and, if necessary, to block the transaction.90 Even African countries,
which were initially enthusiastic about Chinese investments, are experiencing backlash due to concerns over “China’s intentions and . . .
whether its investment was in the Continent’s best interests.”91
The real fear for the recipient countries is that if they sell off more and
more of their economy and country each year, they will be subjugating
themselves to a “sharecropper economy.”92 While this would be undesirable, economic protectionism or nationalism is not the answer. Globalization of the financial capital market has many benefits.93 For example,
businesses are no longer tied to their own domestic capital market and
can obtain capital at a lower cost94 by tapping into international capital.95
88. Lowery, supra note 14.
89. Lyons, supra note 5, at 16–17.
90. Jonathan Braude, New German Foreign Investment Law Faces Challenges,
LAW.COM, Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202424321685.
91. Lyons, supra note 5, at 16.
92. David R. Francis, Will Sovereign Wealth Funds Rule the World?: These Enormous Government-owned Funds May Turn Their Economic Clout into Political Gain,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 26, 2007, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/
1126/p16s01-wmgn.html.
93. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 124–26.
94. To illustrate the benefits of and differences between a purely domestic (“closed”)
capital market and an international (“open”) capital market, we can look at the cost of
capital. N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 53, 115 (4th ed. 2003). The cost of
capital is really the cost of borrowing or the interest rate. Id. at 54–55. The interest rate is
determined by the supply of capital and the demand for capital, and is inexplicably tied to
a country’s economic output. Id. at 59–61. One measure of the output of a country’s
economy is the gross domestic product (“GDP”). Id. at 15–16. Under the expenditure
method of measuring GDP in a closed economy, GDP = Consumption (C) + Investment
(I) + Government Spending (G). Id. at 53. A simple reorganization of this equation shows
that I = GDP – C – G – net exports (NE); in other words, investment is always equal to
the national savings in a purely domestic market. Id. at 59–61. As we can see, the nation-
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It also helps countries finance current account deficits.96 Among these
benefits is the increased ability of investors to spread risk by diversification into different markets, contributing to the stability of the global financial market.97 The biggest threat to maximizing the benefits of a
global capital market, as Deputy Secretary Kimmitt noted, is “investment
protectionism,” the erection of barriers to foreign investment.98 To reduce the risk that countries will engage in protectionist conduct, regulations need to encourage SWFs to behave in a purely commercial manner.
C. Market Distortions
SWFs have the potential of creating market distortion because of their
size and their governmental connections.99 SWFs are “already large
enough to be systemically significant,” and if they are imprudently managed and misguidedly take risk, there will be broad consequences for
the whole market.100 For example, there is a danger that SWFs might not
perceive risk correctly. Unlike traditional financial institutions, SWFs are
accountable only to their respective governments because they are their
only principal. This feature is a benefit for the financial market because
capital requirements or investor withdrawals cannot force SWFs to liquidate their holdings;101 however, this very feature also creates the risk of
al savings limits the supply of capital, and simple logic tells us that cost increases when
demand increases against a limited supply. Id.
Now suppose we move to an open capital market system. In such a system, GDP
= C + I + G + NE, and thus, investment = national savings + net foreign investment. Id. at
24–26, 117–18. This means that if this type of economy has more investment opportunities than national savings, foreign investment can be used to supplement the deficit. Id. at
121–24. Alternatively, if there is more savings than good investment opportunities, investors can invest in foreign markets. Id. This leads to a more efficient allocation of capital
because in this case, excess capital can be directed to more profitable ventures. This also
benefits businesses that have great ideas, but would have been foreclosed from pursuing
them because the cost of capital is too high.
95. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 124; Gen. Atl.: Global Growth Investors, Thought Leadership: Accessing Global Capital Markets: Benefits and Challenges, Mar. 8, 2007,
http://www.generalatlantic.com/en/news/article/53 (General Atlantic is a global private
equity fund.).
96. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 124.
97. See generally René M. Stulz, Globalization of Equity Markets and the Cost of
Capital, (Dice Ctr., Working Paper No. 99-1, 1999) (providing a more detailed discussion of the effects of globalization of capital markets on cost of capital and effects of
risk).
98. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 126.
99. See generally Truman Testimony, supra note 4, at 3.
100. Kimmitt, supra note 2, at 122; Lowery, supra note 14.
101. Kimmitt, supra note 2, at 122; Lowery, supra note 14.
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low accountability.102 SWFs typically have no clearly defined liabilities
like pension funds or other institutional investors; instead, they tend to
have broadly defined goals and are rarely earmarked for specific government expenditures.103 With essentially no liabilities,104 there is a danger that fund managers may take excessive risks and treat losses as irrelevant so long as there is no strong domestic accountability.
Unfortunately, there is usually little, if any, regulation governing SWF
behavior either directly or indirectly.105 Therefore, investor discipline
will depend on citizen monitoring because there is no market discipline
through institutional investors.106 The problem with this reliance is that
there is no incentive for individual citizens to monitor the performance of
the SWF. There is also a free-rider problem with citizen monitoring.
Even one of the smaller SWFs has a value of $400 million, assuming the
information is available, any monitoring of the fund will require significant time, effort, and expense. Furthermore, a party that monitors the
SWF will not be able to capture all of the benefits because other parties
will benefit from the monitoring without incurring the expense. 107 Therefore, parties will have no incentive to do anything more than the average
citizen, which, in this case, will be nothing.
Due to the fact that “SWFs represent large, concentrated, and often
opaque positions in financial markets,” if the funds have distorted risk
preferences, it will have the potential of influencing the market.108 This is
because investment prices may be artificially inflated and misrepresent
the true relative market value.109 There is also a danger that parties will
not practice market discipline in assessing the risk of a particular transaction, but instead rely on the notion of “sovereign guarantee.”110 With the
102. See Lowery, supra note 14.
103. Adrian Blundell-Wignall et. al., Sovereign Wealth and Pension Fund Issues, 94
FIN. MARKET TRENDS 117, 124 (2008).
104. This, of course, does not include SWFs that also serve as a pension fund such as
Norway’s SWF.
105. Lowery, supra note 14.
106. Id. Accountability of SWFs will depend on “what their citizens know and how
active they are in monitoring fund activities.” Id.
107. It is unclear whether there are actual benefits for citizens to monitor their country’s sovereign wealth fund; however, any hypothetical benefits that may or may not exist
will just have a free-rider problem. Furthermore, if no benefits exist, there would be no
incentive to expend the necessary resources to conduct such monitoring.
108. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 122–23.
109. It is conceivable that if a large SWF fails to assess risk properly, it can influence
the market price for that asset by purchasing more of the asset than is prudent. This price,
which is driven up, will not reflect the value of the asset relative to other alternative investments.
110. Lowery, supra note 14.
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threat of parties not practicing market discipline, a substantial risk to
market stability arises if SWFs are not regulated because there is typically limited disclosure of their investment policies, and the private sector
may react to speculation and rumors of potential SWF shifts.111 Therefore, SWFs and the capital market would benefit from regulations that
impose greater transparency, improve the governing and monitoring
structure, and further accountability of the funds.
D. National Security
One of the most critical concerns regarding foreign acquisitions is national security. When dealing with foreign investment, countries need to
be able to “ensure that national security concerns are addressed, without
unnecessarily limiting the benefits of an open economy.”112
The problem with national security issues is that there is no way to clearly define what types of investment invoke these concerns and what types
of investments do not.113 While it may be clear that foreign investment in
a country’s defense industries would raise national security concerns,
there are many other industries that do not fall within the traditional notion of defense but are nonetheless essential to a country’s security.114
Furthermore, something short of acquisition of de jure control, such as
when “an investor seeks board seats or outsized voting rights,” could still
trigger national security concerns.115 Accordingly, anything but purely
passive investment by SWFs has the potential of raising these issues.116
Moreover, as much as FDI may trigger national security concerns, there
is also a risk that recipient countries will use national security as a guise
for protectionism policies.117 This risk creates a twin tension that any
governing policy and principle must balance with care.

111. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 122–23.
112. Id. at 123.
113. See Lyons, supra note 5, at 17.
114. For example, the media, the communication, and the energy industries are essential infrastructures for a country’s national security. Id. at 15. There are also companies
that supply essential war-making materials, e.g., ball bearing manufacturers, but FDI
would only raise national security concerns during a war. The difficulty in determining
which industries raise legitimate national security concerns makes determinations by
organizations such as CFIUS highly subjective and could be used as a guise for protectionism. See id. at 17; Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 126.
115. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 123.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 126.
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E. Strategic Positioning
There is also a fear that SWFs will invest for strategic positioning purposes.118 These purposes may motivate the funds to make investments
with the objective of acquiring intellectual property, skills, and other advantages, and transferring these assets to domestic companies.119
On a macro level, strategic acquisitions may not seem like a problem
because the party that values those assets the most is making use of them;
however, on a micro level, this creates a conflict of interest problem
between the SWFs and other investors. Objectives other than maximization of share values conflict with the interest other investors because
transferring technology or other expertise from a portfolio company to a
domestic company will reduce the value of the portfolio company. 120 All
owners share in this reduction in value, while only the SWF and its government will benefit from the transfer.121 Thus, the fund is essentially
stealing from the portfolio company when it induces these kinds of transfers.
Not only is strategic acquisition fundamentally unfair to the company
and other investors it will also have detrimental effects on the market.122
If investors come to believe that they are at a disadvantage in relation to
the publicly backed entity, it could damage the stability and confidence
in the market.123 After all, who would want to play when the other party
always has an Ace up its sleeve? Therefore, any regulation of SWFs
must address the problem of strategic acquisitions.
118. See Greene & Yeager, supra note 5, at 259; Lyons, supra note 2, at 15.
119. See Lyons, supra note 5, at 15. See also Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at
1361–62 (“SWFs may wish to help domestic companies secure technology or other expertise.”). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A
Common European Approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds, at 5, COM(2008) 115 provisional (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/
sovereign_en.pdf (“SWF investment in certain sectors could be used for ends other than
for maximi[z]ing return. For example, investment targets may reflect a desire to obtain
technology and expertise to benefit national strategic interests, rather than being driven
by normal commercial interests in expansion to new products and markets. By the same
token, holdings could influence decisions by companies operating in area of strategic
interest or governing distribution channels of interest to the sponsor countries. More generally, business and investment decisions could be influenced in the political interest of
the SWFs owners.”). Governments as investors may pursue interests other than economic
ones, such as “technology transfer, access to raw materials, access to buyers or even larger political or social purposes.” Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 259.
120. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1361.
121. Id. at 1362.
122. See Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 259.
123. See id.
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F. The Real Problem: Asymmetric Information
At the root of these concerns is the problem of asymmetric information. The outcries for more transparency on the part of SWFs arise out of
insufficient or unreliable information. The asymmetric problem can be
due to the inability to ascertain the accuracy of information, the lack of
incentives to acquire information, or the inability to acquire the information. While they cannot be attributed to insufficient information per se,
the problems associated with nationalism or protectionism are still based
on the fear and misunderstanding of SWFs.124 So, too, is the problem of
market distortion, which occurs when other parties cannot understand an
SWF’s market behavior and objectives because of insufficient information. Finally, lessening the informational disadvantage of recipient countries can mitigate the dangers of strategic positioning and national security
problems. This is because the recipient country will be able to make decisions on how to respond to foreign acquisitions with accurate information rather than on mere speculation. Also, by strengthening the informational position, host countries have an incentive to limit, if not eliminate,
strategic motives from their investments since they do not want their opportunities limited by restrictive pressures.125 Thus, creating a method of
disclosures that is credible and reliable can decrease most of these concerns.
III. SWFS SHOULD BE REGULATED IN AN INTERNATIONAL FORUM
International regulation and monitoring of SWFs is preferable to domestic regulations and monitoring. In particular, such a forum is attractive because of its ability to alleviate many of the concerns discussed
above. Furthermore, while it is true that even without an international
regime a country can still impose disclosure requirements and other
forms of protections on SWFs, international regulation provides several
additional benefits. Beyond the ability to address the concerns surrounding SWFs, an international forum would protect the host and recipient
countries’ interests, create a level playing field and avoid over-regulation
due to nationalist and protectionist pressures.
First, drafting and implementing regulations internationally protects
both the host countries’ and recipient countries’ interests. It would do
this by creating an opportunity for these countries to have a meaningful
dialog over how SWFs should be regulated. If left solely to domestic
regulations, there is a risk that only recipient countries’ concerns will be
124. See Lyons, supra note 5, at 16.
125. While there are a lot of opportunities available to SWFs, all else equal, I believe
any investor will prefer having more opportunities than less.
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addressed, as SWFs and their host countries will not have an opportunity
to voice their concerns. The ability to express different opinions is essential because SWFs and recipient countries have competing interests. On
the one hand, SWFs want to have unlimited freedom to invest however
they want. On the other hand, recipient countries may want to limit what
SWFs can invest in. Recipient countries have an incentive to enact, and
do enact, legislation and policies that restrict SWFs’ activities to protect
domestic industries from foreign acquisitions.126 Such unilateral development of regulation has the potential of placing SWFs in an unduly disadvantageous position, and even if SWFs are not disadvantaged by the
legislation, a perception that SWFs are being discriminated against may
still result and harm the capital market.
Second, international regulation could create a level playing field and
prevent a race to the bottom. Preventing harmful investments and encouraging beneficial ones should be a major goal of regulating SWFs.
Domestic regulations, however, cannot adequately serve this mission
because recipient countries have two opposing interests in regards to
SWFs. On the one hand, they would like to prevent harmful investments
and even prevent foreign acquisition of domestic interests by imposing
regulations. On the other hand, they want to attract foreign investment to
fund other investments by lowering the barriers to investment.127 This
could lead to under regulation of SWFs by recipient countries, which
creates its own problems.
There is also a genuine risk that underregulation will occur because
countries are in constant competition for investment and capital. Since
the credit crisis began in 2007, the competition for foreign capital has

126. Motivated by the interest in “defending French companies from unwanted predators,” France has proposed to create its own SWF and encouraged other EU countries to
do so. Emma Vandore, France to Create Sovereign Fund, AP NEWS (Paris), Oct. 23,
2008, http://www.blnz.com/news/2008/10/23/France_create_sovereign_fund_4890.html.
This kind of response to the growing acquisition and diversification by SWFs is a great
example of how countries may and do act to resist foreign acquisitions. While the French
response is not using legislative restrictions to prevent foreign acquisitions, this type of
response is still a hostile move towards the free flow of capital and should not be encouraged.
127. See Ralph Gowling, France Invites Overseas Wealth Funds, REUTERS (London),
Nov. 3, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUKTRE4A206I20081103; Ben
Hall & Scheherazade Daneshku, France’s Invitation to Overseas Wealth Funds, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/232fa6a4-a92f-11dd-a19a-000077b07658.
html?nclick_check=1; Michael R. Sesit, Sarkozy Turns Sovereign Fund Idea Upside
Down: Michael R. Sesit, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601039&refer=columnist_sesit&sid=aiq0GQVKxg_Q.
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become even greater.128 Some countries have not only been open to SWF
investments but also actively sought them.129 They accomplish this by
lowering transaction costs or giving preferred treatment to certain investors, which can be done by offering preferential tax treatments, such as
deferred taxes or lower tax rates,130 or by having favorable regulations. In
an environment where countries are in desperate need of capital, countries may decide that the benefit of more capital outweighs the cost of
bad investments and lower their regulations to attract more investments.
Market forces will then force other countries to lower their regulations or
miss out on the benefits of investments by SWFs.131 Eventually, if the
need for competition is strong enough, market forces will cause countries
to reduce their regulation to the minimum level and, perhaps, to no regulation at all.
Because of the macroeconomic impact that SWFs can have on the
global economy, it is undesirable for countries to decide that capital is
more important than a safe and stable investing environment. Not only
will competition for capital create incentive problems on the regulation
of SWFs; it will also create global and regional systemic problems.132
Any regional market has a certain level of liquidity and shock absorbent
abilities.133 Because SWFs control a significant block of wealth, any sudden movement by them will have significant impacts on the local markets.134 Take Romania, for example, one of the newest members of the
European Union. Its annual nominal GDP in 2007 was $166 billion, and

128. See, e.g., Andrew Hay & Manuel Maria, Spain Wants Sovereign Wealth Funds to
Help Cover Its Debt, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 20, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/
2008/10/20/business/peseta.php.
129. See id.
130. In a personal income context, we can see tax deferred and tax exempted savings
plans performing a similar function to incentivize individuals to allocate their wealth to a
particular area. These plans encourage deferring consumption to a later time by saving for
retirement.
131. The country that has the least amount of regulation (let us call it “Country A”)
receives two benefits. First, the potential pool of investors has just increased because
more of the SWFs are able to meet their regulations, of course, assuming that not all
SWFs are already able to meet the regulatory requirements. Second, the cost of investing
is lower since the component cost of compliance is lower. Because the cost of investing is
less, SWFs, both good and bad, will flock to Country A because they are able to retain
more profits. However, once other countries observe that Country A is receiving these
benefits, they too will likely want a piece of the pie and also lower their regulation, even
though these benefits would not exist if all States had the same regulations.
132. See Lyons, supra note 5, at 18–19.
133. See id. at 19.
134. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 122–23. See also Lyons, supra note 5, at 19.
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it had approximately $46 billion in investments that year.135 Compared to
the United States, which has $13.84 trillion in GDP with $2.1 trillion in
investments, Romania’s market is relatively small, and an influx of capital or sudden decrease in capital availability will have significantly greater effects on its economy.136 Furthermore, there is a chance that any capital market regardless of size could experience a total collapse given a
sufficiently large market shock. In addition to the risk of market shock
and stability, the risk of sudden movement by SWFs will cause a rise in
interest rates, because an interest rate is an aggregate of the real interest
rate, inflation expectation, risk premium, and liquidity preference.137 An
increase in risk will require borrowers to offer additional risk premiums
to compensate the investors.138 Therefore, ceteris paribus, an increase in
risk will cause an increase in interest rates.139
Above all else, a level playing field will ensure that investments and
allocation of capital will be made on the basis of risk and reward, rather
than on the cost of compliance with regulatory requirements. If we accept that the principle goal of international finance is to place capital in
the hands of those who can use it best, a system that allocates resources
based on compliance cost is untenable. In such a system, compliance cost
operates as a tax on SWFs. While it is not entirely clear who will ultimately bear the cost of the tax, companies that depend on SWF investments are the most likely candidates. This is because no one market dominates the international capital market to such a degree that there are no
alternative venues for SWFs to invest.140
A uniform, or even a mostly uniform, regulatory system will have the
additional benefit of lower compliance cost and redundancy.141 The
banking privacy regulation in the United States demonstrates these benefits in a domestic context. In the United States, banks are subject to a
situation similar to what SWFs experience. They are subject to regula135. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 34.
136. Id.
137. See Mankiw, supra note 94, at 57, 89–95, 271–73.
138. See id. at 57.
139. See id.
140. With $164 trillion in global financial assets, it will not be difficult for SWFs to
find opportunities all over the world to invest their 1.8% worth of global financial assets.
See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 49, at 10–11 (indicating the amount of global
financial assets). Even if SWFs are foreclosed from investing in U.S. denominated assets,
there still remains almost $100 trillion worth of other financial assets in which SWFs can
invest. See id.
141. Elizabeth K. Brill, Privacy and Financial Institutions: Current Developments
Concerning the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 21 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 167, 216–
17 (2002).
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tions by multiple jurisdictions and benefit from a uniform system. With
varying privacy regulations among states, and between state and federal
requirements, large financial services organizations will likely face overlapping and conflicting privacy regulations.142 Financial services will
also “be vulnerable to more stringent, and inevitably conflicting, state
regulation.”143 Uniform regulation is necessary for maximum efficiency
and equity144: “[c]ompanies benefit from decreased compliance cost . . . .
Consumers benefit from a more consistent and comprehensible regulatory system.”145
Using the same logic, these benefits of uniform regulations also extend
to SWFs. By adopting uniform international regulations to govern SWF
behavior, the funds only have to comply with one set of regulatory requirements, rather than comply with requirements of each individual
country. The recipient countries also benefit because they are able to
pool the cost of monitoring compliance, rather than having to individually monitor each and every potential SWF investor. Finally, this approach
discharges the problem and possibility of conflicting regulations.
The danger also remains that certain countries will take a protectionist
position and overregulate SWF investments.146 One of the major goals of
regulating SWFs is to prevent harmful investments and encourage beneficial ones, and overregulation has the potential of driving away foreign
investment.147 While international regulations are unlikely to eliminate
all protectionist problems, they do have the potential to reduce protectionist pressures.148

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. This is particularly evident when we consider the fact that French President Nicolas Sarkozy “called on European nations to create sovereign wealth funds” to protect
national industries. Simon Kennedy, Sarkozy Proposes European Sovereign Wealth
Funds: Wealth Funds Could Prevent Foreign Buyers Getting European Firms Cheaply,
MARKETWATCH (London), Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/frenchpresident-proposes-european-sovereign/story.aspx?guid={A1273F1E-E0A6-40FB-B4D1-C
C8105234E73}&dist=msr_1; Erik Kirschbaum, Several German Leaders Reject Sarkozy’s Economic Proposals, REUTERS (Berlin), Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/
article/usDollarRpt/idUSLL47443420081021?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0.
147. See Henny Sender & Mure Dickie, China Fears Scupper $2bn Deal for 3Com,
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0b3e3988-dfe6-11dc-8073-000077
9fd2ac.html.
148. See INT’L WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, supra note 16, at 4.
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IV. THE SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES
A. What Are the Santiago Principles?
In October 2007, the International Monetary and Financial Committee149 expressed the need for “further analysis of key issues for investors
and recipients of SWF flows, including a dialogue on identifying best
practices.”150 Based on this need, the International Working Group of
Sovereign Wealth Funds (“IWG”) was founded April 30—May 1, 2008.151
With Hamad Al Hurr Al Suwaidi152 and Jaime Caruana153 as co-chairs,
the IWF consists of twenty-six IMF members with SWFs.154 Using results from an IMF-commissioned voluntary survey on current structures
and practices, drawing from widely-accepted international principles and
practices, and taking input from a number of recipient countries, the
IWG developed a set of Generally Accepted Principles and Practices
(“GAPP”), also known as the “Santiago Principles.”155 Underlying the
different principles of the GAPP are four foundational objectives:
i) To help maintain a stable global financial system and free flow of
capital and investment;
ii) To comply with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements in the countries in which they invest;
iii) To invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and returnrelated considerations; and
iv) To have in place a transparent and sound governance structure that
provides for adequate operational controls, risk management, and accountability.156

The IWG identified several purposes for the development of the
GAPP: (1) increase countries’ and the financial markets’ understanding
of SWFs; (2) ensure that the international financial market continues to
benefit from SWF participation in the financial market; (3) support the
“institutional framework, governance, and investment operations of SWFs
149. The International Monetary and Financial Committee is a committee of the Board
of Governors of the IMF. Id. at 1.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Hamad Al Hurr Al Suwaidi is the Undersecretary of the Abu Dhabi Finance Department. Id.
153. Jaime Caruana is the Director of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department
of the IMF. Id.
154. Id. at 1 n.2.
155. Id. at 1–2.
156. Id. at 4.
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that are guided by their policy purpose and objectives and consistent with
a sound macroeconomic policy framework”; and (4) “improve understanding of SWFs as economically and financially oriented entities in both the
home and recipient countries” for the “stability of the global financial
system, reduc[tion of] protectionist pressures, and . . . maint[enance] of
an open and stable investment climate.”157 To achieve these goals, the
IWG is relying on cooperation from recipient countries and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”).158
Comprised of twenty-four rules, the Santiago Principles are a voluntary
set of criteria “that the members of the IWG support and either have implemented or aspire to implement.”159 These principles are subject to applicable laws of the home country and any intergovernmental agreements.160 The IWG expects that the GAPP will guide SWF activities so
that the funds will invest professionally and help institute-related reforms.161 Finally, the IWG assumes that all SWFs will operate on a good
faith basis and comply with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements.162
The Santiago Principles are divided into three groups: “(i) legal
framework, objectives, and coordination with macroeconomic policies;
(ii) institutional framework and governance structure; and (iii) investment and risk management framework.”163 The IWG explains that the
principles in the first area “underpin a robust institutional framework and
governance structure of the SWF, and facilitate formulation of appropriate investment strategies consistent with the SWF’s stated policy objectives.”164 The second area ensures that SWF investments are free from
political influences by separating the owner, the government, and the
management to create operational independence.165 The third area promotes sound investment operation and accountability as well as demonstrates operational discipline.166 The IWG expects that different SWFs
will have different time frames for adopting the GAPP because of the
evolving nature of SWFs, the different maturity levels of the funds, as
well as their different investment objectives, horizons, and strategies.167
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, the IWG considers the GAPP to be a minimum standard for
SWFs, but recognizes that not all principles will be applicable to every
SWF.168
B. Criticisms of the Santiago Principles
The Santiago Principles offer important guidelines for the structure,
governance, and management of SWFs; however, they have several
flaws that will constrain their effectiveness in achieving their stated objectives. First, the GAPP is too focused on SWFs as entities and not
enough on their relationship with recipient countries. Second, there are
no standards to measure compliance with or achievement of the Principles. Third, the Santiago Principles do not address the asymmetric information problems faced by recipient countries. Finally, there are no
sanctions or rewards available to ensure compliance.
Rather than balancing the interests and concerns of both host and recipient countries, the Santiago Principles focus exclusively on what SWFs
and the host countries should do. While principles concerning the proper
structuring, governance, and management of SWFs are important, the
relationship among the funds, the host countries, and the recipient countries is far more important. As demonstrated above, the problems surrounding SWFs or foreign investments in general are not one-sided. Instead, it is the tension among the competing interests of parties that is the
source of the problems and deserves the attention of the international
community.
For instance, it is not necessary for SWFs to disclose every piece of financial data or every strategy; however, it would be insufficient for the
funds to merely release a statement containing only publicly available
information. Excessive disclosure requirements are also problematic,
because they would inhibit the SWFs’ daily management and goal of
maximizing returns, since every strategy decision would be public information. Additionally, disclosures for the sake of formality alone
would not create a more stable global capital market since they do not
actually ease the informational barrier. Simply repackaging publicly
available information is convenient for other parties, but it does not improve their informational position in the least.
A similar situation exists for asset allocation. SWFs should not be required to provide the world with a detailed list of which companies they
have invested in and the size of their investment. This would simply impose an unnecessary cost because whether or not an SWF invested in a
paper towel company does not matter to recipient countries or the finan168. Id. at 6.
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cial market. However, a system could be created that requires disclosures
when an SWF invests in a particular list of companies or industries. This
kind of scheme would put SWFs on notice that recipient countries are
concerned about these companies and industries for either strategic or
national security purposes, and would also limit potential protectionist
regulations. As the above two examples illustrate, the international
community needs to focus not on SWFs and recipient countries separately, but as one problem. By dealing solely with the SWFs’ side of the
problem, the Santiago Principles are essentially putting a Band-Aid over
a gaping wound.
The GAPP lacks measurable standards that an SWF, host country, recipient country, counterparty, or third-party can use to determine to what
extent and how effectively a particular SWF has achieved these minimum principles. It is important to remember that these Principles should
not be adopted simply for the sake of having basic principles. Instead,
constructive feedback is essential for the continued development of
international norms governing SWFs in this ever-changing financial
market landscape.169 Constructive feedback requires that there is some
method of measuring success. How can one know whether SWFs and
recipient countries can work together to increase the stability of the financial market, avoid protectionism, etc., without knowing whether the
measures implemented thus far are effective or even serving the purposes
that they are suppose to serve? By not creating a standard to measure
whether the Santiago Principles are a success, the IWG deprived the
GAPP of an essential tool to improve the Principles’ effectiveness and
make them a success.
Furthermore, the Santiago Principles do not address the asymmetric information problems faced by recipient countries. The GAPP in a number
of sections and subsections calls for various public disclosures.170 This
movement towards transparency is an important step in dealing with the
asymmetric information problem, because the adoption of these Principles demonstrates that SWFs and the IWG recognize the importance of
transparency. However, the asymmetric information problem does not lie
solely with the lack of information, but with the lack of credible information. By failing to create a method to ascertain this, the effectiveness of
any disclosure will be limited.171 This cripples the Santiago Principles in
169. The IWG noted in the introduction that “constructive and collaborative response
from the recipient countries will be essential” to ensure the success of the GAPP. Id. at 4.
170. See id. at 7–9. (Articles 2, 4, 15–19, and 21–22 of the GAPP are particularly relevant.)
171. See supra Part II. This would be similar to the former USSR claiming to be destroying its nuclear arsenal but not allowing inspectors to verify the claim. Setting aside
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the area where they are most needed. When countries trust each other
and have a good relationship, they do not need to rely on the Principles
because they have no reason to suspect foul play. National security and
strategic acquisition concerns are not a concern.172 In contrast, when
countries do not trust each other, disclosures that comply with the GAPP
would not ease the concerns of recipient countries because they will consider the disclosures unreliable. If the Santiago Principles are only effective when they are not needed and are ineffective when they are actually
needed, what possible benefit will they provide besides recognizing that
there is a problem?
Finally, because the GAPP is a voluntary set of principles subject to
the laws of host countries, there are no rewards or sanctions available to
encourage or force compliance. Given the recognized importance of
sound regulation of SWFs, ideally there should be a mechanism that will
ensure that parties comply with the Principles and will encourage the
adoption of the GAPP. It is foreseeable that counterparties could require
the adoption of the GAPP through contract; however, the adoption of the
GAPP by SWFs, limited as it is, should not be left to private dealings.
Instead, it should be required as a systemic control for the stability of the
world’s financial market.173
C. How to Improve the Santiago Principles
Given the limitations of the Santiago Principles, there are several devices that could improve their operation and effectiveness. Crippled by
the failure to address the relational element between SWFs and other
market participants, the lack of standards, and the asymmetric information problem, I propose four changes to the structure and elements that I
believe will improve the Santiago Principles’ chance of success.
First, the IWG and OECD should collaborate and create an expanded
list of guiding principles to address not only what SWFs should do as
best practices, but also the relationship and competing interests of parties. A collaborative approach would allow both sides to voice various
the dissimilarity of any relationship between an SWF or its host country and a recipient
country, and the relationship between the United States and the former USSR, this example illustrates that a mechanism to ascertain creditability is essential for any long-term
monitoring arrangements.
172. See Lyons, supra note 5, at 16–17 (demonstrating that the cases towards which
there was strong political opposition involved SWFs whose host countries were considered unfriendly to the recipient countries).
173. Parties can require compliance with the Santiago Principles as a condition to
doing business, but this assumes that any counterparty will have the leverage necessary to
force SWFs to accept these kinds of restrictions.
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concerns, and identify a balanced approach to deal with the problems
surrounding SWFs. As discussed above, it would be ideal if the IWG and
OECD developed a single system of regulation.174 Furthermore, the collaboration between the two needs to deal with SWFs’ relationships with
third-parties because recipient countries are not the only interested participants. Unlike the current Santiago Principles, this method would address a fuller spectrum of concerns that are raised in the international
capital market.175
Second, this collaborative group should create more specific guidelines
for disclosure requirements and create standard disclosures. The development of specific disclosure requirements would benefit the market by
creating a more level playing field176 and address the information imbalance among the parties. Standard disclosures reduce the informational
imbalance by creating reasonable expectations of what will be disclosed
and establishing a minimum standard of transparency. This method would
protect SWFs from having unreasonable disclosure requirements imposed
on them177 and would also ensure that recipient countries have the information necessary to protect their national security and other domesticinterests.178 Standardized disclosure requirements, by avoiding duplication,
would also benefit SWFs by lowering costs associated with their production.
Third, the GAPP should create a standard that permits the IWG and its
corollary to measure how successful the Santiago Principles are in accomplishing their objectives. It would aid them in developing a plan for
improving the effectiveness of the Principles. More importantly, such
standards would enable the parties to monitor the actions of both SWFs
and recipient countries, which would help ensure fair play and minimize
systematic risk.
Finally, an independent audit committee should be created. This committee should be composed of individuals appointed from an equal number
174. See supra Part IV.A.
175. See supra Part IV.C.
176. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the benefits of a level playing field).
177. The drive towards transparency will probably lessen with increased disclosure,
and the adoption of disclosures similar to those of Norway’s SWF will help alleviate the
fear of SWF activities. As discussed above, disclosure of reliable information is essential
not only for the protection of national security interests, but also to the stability of the
international capital market. Standard disclosure, however, will not eliminate the threat of
overregulation until the GAPP or its successor evolves from a voluntary set of principles
to a binding treaty that controls both SWFs and recipient countries.
178. By using a collaborative approach, recipient countries can seek to integrate into
the standard disclosure the information necessary for the protection of their national security and domestic interests.
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of members from SWFs and recipient countries, and one member nominated by the IMF. It should be granted access to all relevant materials to
ensure compliance with the GAPP and the validity of disclosures, and be
required to publish its findings. By using an independent committee to
verify information, parties could be assured that the information disclosed by the SWFs is indeed credible. Furthermore, this approach would
recognize the risk of unlimited access to confidential information. In exchange for unlimited access to the SWFs’ information, the committee
should be required to sign nondisclosure agreements that would limit the
use of the information for the sole purpose of verifying the disclosures.
By addressing both what should be disclosed and the creditability issue,
the GAPP could significantly reduce the asymmetric information problem.
CONCLUSION
While there are severe limitations to the Santiago Principles, they still
remain an important first step in the creation of a new international norm.
The GAPP outlined the various concerns relating to SWFs and created a
forum for addressing how SWFs should behave and how other parties
should treat them. However, despite these advances, the Santiago Principles will eventually need to address the asymmetric information problem
as well as the relational element between SWFs and recipient countries
in order to more fully address the concerns connected to state capitalism
and the use of SWFs. The development of standardized disclosures,
benchmarks of success, and an independent audit committee would be a
beneficial step for the future of regulating and monitoring SWFs’ activities and their evolution as financial instruments.
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